Rationing Justice in the 21st Century: Technocracy and Technology in the Access to Justice Movement by Kunkel, Rebecca
University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender
and Class
Volume 18 | Issue 2 Article 7
Rationing Justice in the 21st Century: Technocracy
and Technology in the Access to Justice Movement
Rebecca Kunkel
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/rrgc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law.
For more information, please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rebecca Kunkel, Rationing Justice in the 21st Century: Technocracy and Technology in the Access to Justice Movement, 18 U. Md. L.J. Race




RATIONING JUSTICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
TECHNOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY  





More than fifty years since the creation of a federal Legal Ser-
vices Program with the mission to “marshall the forces of law to combat 
the causes and effects of poverty,”1 a growing proportion of the legal 
needs of the nation’s poor and working classes are going unmet.2 
Awareness that there is a broadening “justice gap” is widespread in the 
legal profession.3 However, the inherently political questions raised by 
this state of affairs, and what it suggests about our national commit-
ments to ideals of justice and equality, have been largely obscured by a 
barrage of policy discussions proposing modest technical interven-
tions.4 
 
This paper will attempt to bring the technocratic discourse sur-
rounding the justice gap into dialog with these larger political questions. 
The argument proceeds in three parts. In Part II, I place the justice gap 
discussion into the wider context of the history of federally funded legal 
aid. While major events in this history have been documented else-
where, the tendency of many recent proposals aimed at redressing the 
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1 William P. Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid: Congress and 
the Legal Services Corporation from the 1960s to the 1990s, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 241, 
246 (1998) (quoting a speech given by then-director of LSP in 1965, delivered to the National 
Legal Aid and Defender Association). 
2 See The Justice Gap: Measuring the Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-income Americans, 
LEGAL SERVS. CORP. 1, 30 (2017), https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJus-
ticeGap-FullReport.pdf [hereinafter The Justice Gap] (“Low-income Americans receive inade-
quate or no professional legal help for 86% of the civil legal problems they face in a given 
year.”).   
3 See James D. Abrams & Ann Hancock, The Justice Gap and Pro Bono Legal, AM. BAR ASSOC. 
(Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/commercial-busi-
ness/spotlight/2017/justice-gap-pro-bono-legal/. 
4 See infra Part IV. 
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justice gap has been to gloss over historical and political conditions, ob-
scuring the relationship between the justice gap, conservative opposi-
tion to federal legal aid, and the broader bipartisan project of welfare 
retrenchment and neoliberalization that took place over the past four 
decades.5 Part III will shift focus to the normative discourse surrounding 
access to justice.6 In this part, I argue that a major current of thought 
within the access to justice movement has chosen to focus on narrow, 
technical interventions in the court system and legal services agencies. 
This current of thought—which takes both poverty and inadequate lev-
els of investment in services to the poor as a given—developed out of a 
pervasive neoliberal political rationality which limits the parameters of 
acceptable discourse, and operates to suppress awareness of the ideo-
logical or structural dimensions of these policy discussions.7 Part IV de-
velops this thesis in further detail by analyzing a particular but fre-
quently repeated theme: that technological developments will “fix” to 
the problems presented by the justice gap.8 
 
II. THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
The contemporary understanding of the term access to justice 
emerged from the legal profession's mid-century debates over provision 
of legal representation to the poor, where it was often used to describe 
the purpose of legal aid.9 By the late 1970s, federal funding for legal aid 
had become firmly established, and the model of the public interest law 
firm appeared to have taken hold as a means to continue to enforce and 
expand the gains of the rights revolution of the 1960s.10 It was at this 
time that access to justice began to take on the appearance of a cohesive 
social movement.11 This appearance was fostered in large part by Mauro 
Cappelletti and Bryant Garth’s influential four volume study, published 
in 1978, which documented access to justice in Europe and the United 
                                                          
5 See infra Part II. 
6 See infra Part III. 
7 Id. 
8 See infra Part IV. 
9 Marc Galanter, Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability, 37 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 115, 116 n.3 (2010). 
10 See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR 
CONTROL OF THE LAW 56 (2008) (discussing the “development of the liberal legal network” 
based on numerous factors, including the “social disruptions of the 1960s,” and “critical funding 
and strategic coordination for its emerging infrastructure”). 
11 See MAURO CAPPELLETTI & BRYANT GARTH, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: A WORLD SURVEY 21 
(Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth eds., 1978). 
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States.12 This study was structured around what Cappelletti identified as 
three “waves” of the movement: legal aid, followed by public interest 
litigation, and more recently, efforts to simplify the legal process and 
introduce alternative dispute resolution measures.13 Although few dis-
cussions of access to justice since this time have treated the phrase as 
narrowly signifying the purpose of legal aid, the availability of legal 
representation for the poor remained a central concern.14 Cappelletti was 
careful to stress the limits of the wave metaphor, emphasizing the con-
tinued relevancy and even centrality of legal aid in ensuring access to 
justice.15 Today, it is frequently the case that contemporary authors 
point out the basic inadequacy of legal aid and the need for access to 
justice to involve major departures from the premise of attorney-pro-
vided legal representation for the poor.16 Nonetheless, the legal aid par-
adigm still functions as a starting point for this discussion, indicating its 
continued significance. 
 
The nation’s legal aid system went through rapid change and ex-
pansion in the 1960s, as funding for legal aid attorneys went from being 
almost entirely private and locally provided, to being supported by a 
federal agency with a broad mission to provide legal services to all 
Americans who were in need of but unable to afford them.17 From the 
time of the earliest legal aid societies in the 1870s until 1964, legal aid 
                                                          
12 The four-volume study is based on a four-year comparative research project entitled “Florence 
Access-to-Justice Project,” sponsored by the Ford Foundation and, with slightly more local fo-
cus, the Italian National Council of Research (CNR). The volumes, under the general editorship 
of Mauro Cappelletti are: VOLUME I. ACCESS TO JUSTICE: A WORLD SURVEY (Mauro Cappelletti 
& Bryant Garth eds.); VOLUME II. ACCESS TO JUSTICE: STUDIES OF PROMISING INSTITUTIONS 
(Mauro Cappelletti & John Weisner eds.); VOLUME III. ACCESS TO JUSTICE: EMERGING 
PERSPECTIVES AND ISSUES (Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth eds.); and VOLUME IV. PATTERNS 
IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: ESSAYS IN THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LAW. ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AN 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (Klaus-Friedrich Koch ed.). Bryant G. Garth & Mauro Cap-
pelletti, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effec-
tive, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 181, 181 (1978). 
13 CAPPELLETTI & GARTH, supra note 11, at 21. 
14 See infra Part III. 
15 Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice and the Welfare State: An Introduction, 
in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE 5–6 (Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds., 1981). In 
response to the question of whether the wave metaphor should be taken literally to imply a 
succession that replaces the previous waves, the authors commented: 
Our view is that the third phase in the access-to-justice movement should 
be seen as an absorption, not a replacement of the first two. The three should 
embody a coherent effort to enforce and expand the new rights that now 
belong to the underprivileged sectors of society–the poor, tenants, consum-
ers, environmentalists, employees.  
Id.  
16 See infra notes 83–85 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 19–29 and accompanying text. 
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had been administered locally through charitable organizations, munic-
ipalities, and attorney pro bono, resulting in a patchwork system which 
tended to concentrate around large urban centers.18 The 1960s saw the 
country’s first efforts to coordinate and fund legal aid on a national scale 
through the Legal Services Program (LSP), a department within the Of-
fice of Economic Opportunity  (OEO).19 Part of LSP’s agenda was to 
support the work of existing legal aid societies by funding individual 
representation, and the program was credited with more than quadru-
pling the number of lawyers able to devote their careers to legal aid from 
about 600 nationally in 1964 to over 2,500 a decade later.20  However, 
due partly to the larger goals of the OEO and its role in the Johnson 
administration’s War on Poverty, and partly in recognition of the limits 
that its budget placed on the goal of universal representation, the early 
LSP also stressed a more ambitious goal: to use legal aid cases instru-
mentally to accomplish systemic reforms that would mitigate and ad-
dress the causes of poverty.21   
 
The idea of using public funds to effectuate changes in the 
established legal order was never without tension, and the Legal 
Services Program met with vigorous opposition almost from its 
inception.22 Perhaps the most notorious examples took place in 
California in the 1960’s. In 1967, California Rural Legal Assistance 
(CRLA) won several high-profile victories in short succession with the 
aid of funds from LSP.23 In the first high-profile case, Morris v. 
Williams, CRLA lawyers successfully invalidated restrictions on 
California medical assistance which had been promulgated by recently-
elected governor Ronald Reagan as part of a larger effort to cut the 
state’s various welfare programs.24 In a second case, Ortiz v. Wirtz, 
CRLA won a victory against the state’s powerful agricultural interests 
when it invalidated a Department of Labor ruling that had permitted 
                                                          
18 Quigley, supra note 1, at 243–45. 
19 Id. at 245. 
20 Gary Bellow, Legal Services to the Poor: An American Report, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND 
THE WELFARE STATE 49, 49–50 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1981). 
21 See Stephen K. Huber, Thou Shalt Not Ration Justice: History and Bibliography of Legal Aid, 
44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754, 759–60  (1976) (“Law reform through test case litigation had be-
come the primary goal of local Legal Services Programs because they had far more clients than 
could be served effectively.”); Quigley, supra note 1, at 245–46 (noting that LSP “placed a high 
priority on reform of the law to make it more responsive to the poor”).   
22 Walter Karabian, Legal Services for the Poor: Some Political Observations, 6 U. S.F. L. REV. 
253, 256 (1972). 
23 Id. at 257. 
24 Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d. 733, 784 (Cal. 1967); EARL JOHNSON, JR., TO ESTABLISH 
JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF CIVIL LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 122–23 
(2014). 
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farm owners to bring in low-wage workers from Mexico.25 Governor 
Reagan responded in 1968 with a thwarted attempt to veto CRLA's 
receipt of federal funds,26 a move which foreshadowed what would be-
come continued antagonism towards LSC during his presidential admin-
istration.27 CRLA’s successes also propelled California Senator George 
Murphy to propose legislation that would have prevented LSP-funded 
attorneys from suing government entities,28  the first in a series of efforts 
to restrict the efficacy of legal services lawyers which would eventually 
prove successful.29 
 
At the time that the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) was cre-
ated in 1974, supporters widely viewed it as a means to isolate the Legal 
Services Program from direct political pressure by removing it from the 
executive branch.30 This danger posed by direct executive control of the 
agency was poignantly exposed during the Nixon administration, with 
Nixon’s appointment of Howard Philips to head LSP.31 Philips was a 
vocal opponent of legal services who “had as his first order of business 
a plan to dismantle the program.”32 Although Nixon vetoed the original 
bill in 1971, a compromise bill creating the Legal Services Corporation 
was eventually signed into law in 1974, shortly before his resignation.33 
The 1974 Act successfully placed the administration of Legal Services 
in an independent government corporation, but the hope that this move 
would insulate the program from political interference proved to be 
short lived.34 As it stood, LSC depended on Congress to re-appropriate 
funds for the program annually.35   
 
Conservative opponents were galvanized by the idea of “leftist” 
attorneys receiving public funds to further the “radical” agenda of 
                                                          
25 Ortiz v. Wirtz, No. 47803 (N.D. Cal. 1967); JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 124. 
26 Jerome B. Falk, Jr. & Stuart R. Pollak, Political Interference with Publicly Funded Lawyers: 
The CRLA Controversy and The Future of Legal Services, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 599, 609 (1973). 
27 Robert Hornstein et al., The Politics of Equal Justice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
1089, 1096 (2003). See Quigley, supra note 1, at 257–59 (discussing how LSC was “being 
starved financially” in the 1980s).   
28 Falk & Pollak, supra note 26, at 609 (citing 113 CONG. REC. 27,871 (1967)). 
29 See infra notes 44–60 and accompanying text.  
30 Quigley, supra note 1, at 251–52. 
31 Id. at 253.   
32 Hornstein et al., supra note 27, at 1094. 
33 Quigley, supra note 1, at 252–53. 
34 Id. at 253–54. 
35 Id. 
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reshaping the legal system,36 and the annual battle over appropriations 
proved to be an opportunity ripe for opposition.37  In 1981, President 
Reagan’s first annual budget proposal eliminated all direct funding for 
LSC.38 While Congress ultimately rejected the plan, the resulting com-
promise cut the agency’s budget by over 25% in a single year, from 
$321 million to $241 million.39 While Reagan failed in his attempt to 
abolish LSC completely, a major consequence of the attempt was that 
much-reduced levels of funding became the agency’s new normal.40  
After reaching a high point in 1981, federal funding for legal services 
did not recover to prior levels until 1992.41  When adjusted for inflation, 
the descent was even more striking—in real dollars, LSC has never 
come close to its 1981 level of funding in all of the years since.42 This 
decline in LSC’s funding has occurred in spite of the fact that over the 
same period, the poverty rate has continued to fluctuate between about 
12-15% of the total population, and the total number of Americans liv-
ing in poverty has grown from about 30 million in 1980 to 43.1 million 
in 2015.43   
 
Since LSC fixes its eligibility criteria as a percentage of the na-
tional poverty level, the number of Americans living in poverty has a 
direct bearing on the demand for its services.44 However, the period of 
time between 1980 and 2015 also saw precipitous growth in rates of 
income and wealth inequality after a brief leveling off during the mid-
                                                          
36 Id. at 255 n.88 (quoting a 1981 letter written by Howard Phillips on behalf of the National 
Defeat Legal Services Committee). 
37 See id. at 255–59 (discussing the constant struggle LSC faced in terms of federal funding). 
38 Stuart Taylor, Jr., House Action Near in Fight Over Legal Aid, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 1981), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/16/us/house-action-near-in-fight-over-legal-aid.html. 
39 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Legal Services Agency Struggles for its Survival, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 
1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/13/us/legal-services-agency-struggles-for-its-sur-
vival.html. 
40 Quigley, supra note 1, at 256–58 (noting Reagan’s strategies of “reduced funding, increased 
restrictions and unsympathetic leadership” to bring about a “slow, painful death” to LSC). 
41 2013 LSC by the Numbers: The Data Underlying Legal Aid Programs, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. 
(July 2014), http://www.lsc.gov/media-center/publications/2013-lsc-numbers [hereinafter 2013 
LSC by the Numbers].   
42 Id. 
43 BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-256(RV), INCOME AND POVERTY 
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015 12 (2016), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/li-
brary/publications/2016/demo/p60-256.pdf. 
44 See 45 C.F.R. § 1611.3(c)(1) (2017) (“As part of its financial eligibility policies, every recip-
ient shall establish annual income ceilings for individuals and households, which may not ex-
ceed one hundred and twenty five perfect (125%) of the current official Federal Poverty Guide-
lines amount.”). 
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twentieth century.45While the relationship between rising material ine-
quality and the need for legal services is less obvious, this trend may be 
at least partly responsible for an increasing number of individuals who 
do not meet the formal criteria for pro bono legal services but who are 
also unable to afford legal representation at market rates.46 Some au-
thors have noted the existence of an “access to justice paradox” in that 
high levels of potential clients who cannot afford the services of attor-
ney currently exist alongside high levels of underemployment or unem-
ployment among recent law graduates.47 Lobel and Chapman cite evi-
dence that during the period between 2000 and 2012, the median 
household income had a net gain of only 3% while average hourly legal 
fees increased 12%.48 This evidence suggests that demand at the top of 
the income scale has played a role in pricing potential low and middle-
income clients out of the legal services market, as has the overall decline 
in working and middle class economic standing.49 
 
The narrowing potential for LSC attorneys to engage in broad 
law reform efforts have compounded the difficulties associated with 
severely limited funding. Over the years, political clashes over LSC 
have resulted in substantive restrictions on the types of cases and 
activities that LSC-funded law offices are permitted handle, in turn 
negating the early LSP/LSC strategy of using law reform to make the 
most effective use of its limited budget.50 The initial compromise that 
established the LSC in 1974 was an early example: the law that 
attempted to save the Legal Services Program by insulating it from 
politics also prevented attorneys from using LSC funds to represent 
clients in certain types of controversial cases, including abortion and 
school desegregation cases.51  By the 1990s, despite more than a decade 
of declining funding, renewed conservative opposition to LSC in 
Congress, led by Newt Gingrich, nearly resulted in the agency once 
                                                          
45 THOMAS PICKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 294 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 
2014). 
46 See Vincent Morris, Navigating Justice: Self-Help Resources, Access to Justice, and Whose 
Job is it Anyway?, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 161, 165 (2013) (noting that as funding for free legal 
services declines, the number of pro se litigants will likely increase). 
47 Jules Lobel & Matthew Chapman, Bridging the Gap Between Unmet Legal Needs and an 
Oversupply of Lawyers: Creating Neighborhood Law Offices – The Philadelphia Experiment, 
22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 71, 72 (2015). 
48 Id. at 79. 
49 See id. at 79–80 (showing that as median household income contracted, average hourly legal 
fees continued to rise leaving middle-income legal consumers “worse” off). 
50 See Quigley, supra note 1, at 248–60 (highlighting LSC’s clash with the federal government 
beginning in the 1960’s which “ultimately damaged the LSC by a combination of drastic fund-
ing cuts and the most severe restrictions on law reform activity”). 
51 Id. at 253. 
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again being phased out of existence completely.52 In another 
compromise designed to save LSC from oblivion, the 1996 
appropriations bill—which continued to fund LSC albeit at a much 
reduced rate—included even more draconian restrictions on the 
activities of those receiving LSC funds.53 These restrictions, many of 
which remain in effect,54 included prohibitions on some of the most ef-
fective tools for effectuating legal change, including class action law-
suits,55 lobbying,56 and training for political activities.57 It also included 
further subject matter and clientele restrictions, preventing LSC attor-
neys from representing clients in abortion cases,58 in prisoners’ rights 
cases,59 and in litigation undertaken on behalf of non-citizens under cer-
tain circumstances.60 
 
In 2005, after many years faced with efforts to undermine its 
mission though a combination of declining funding and activity re-
strictions, LSC published the first version of its widely cited report, 
Documenting the Justice Gap in America.61 Among the report’s conclu-
sions, about one in every two potential legal services clients were being 
turned down due to insufficient agency resources.62 Moreover, this 
“gap” did not appear to be filled either through alternate funding sources 
such as state or local level public funding or attorney pro bono.63  An 
                                                          
52 JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 734. 
53 Quigley, supra note 1, at 260–61. 
54 See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 218 (2017). The 
restrictions adopted in the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-53 (1996), subject to amendments passed by Departments 
of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2510-11 (1998), have been carried forward as conditions on 
LSC’s funding to the current fiscal year. Id. In 2001, the Supreme Court upheld the act in part. 
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001) (invalidating Pub. L. No. 104-134, 
§ 504(a)(16) which prohibited the LSC from participation in “litigation, lobbying, or rulemak-
ing, involving an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare system[,]” but finding that it was 
severable from the rest of the act). 
55 § 504(a)(7), 110 Stat. at 53. 
56 § 504(a)(2)–(4), 110 Stat. at 53. 
57 § 504(12), 110 Stat. at 55. 
58 § 504(14), 110 Stat. at 55. 
59 § 504(15), 110 Stat. at 55. 
60 § 504(11), 110 Stat. at 54–55. 
61 Documenting the Justice Gap in America: The Current Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-
Income Americans, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. (2005), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/LSC/images/justicegap.pdf. Although this is the second edition of Documenting the 
Justice Gap in America, it is “virtually the same” as the 2005 edition and the “only substantive 
changes are the addition of [a] Preface and [an] updated list of the Board of Directors . . . .” Id. 
62 Id. at 4. 
63 Id. 
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updated report published in 2009 found that despite a slight increase in 
funding in the intervening years, about half of the individuals who 
sought assistance from LSC-funded offices were still being turned away 
due to insufficient resources.64 
 
Documenting the Justice Gap in America and its conclusions 
about the unmet need for civil counsel have been widely cited in subse-
quent discussions of access to justice.65 Curiously, the result of much of 
this influence has not generally been, as one might assume, to renew a 
vigorous critique of the substantive and financial restrictions on feder-
ally funded legal aid offices, but rather a growing sense of the justice 
gap as a given and the chronic state of inadequate funding as an immov-
able force of nature.66  
 
Part of what has enabled this reification of the justice gap is a 
common tendency to consider the problem separately from the larger 
political context from which it emerged. As the CLRA incidents illus-
trated, a vigorous legal aid system could be used to directly challenge 
both state power and the power of private business interests.67  Whether 
accurately perceived or not, this threat inspired decades of sustained, 
ideologically motivated opposition to LSC in Congress and the Execu-
tive Branch.68 It is only by ignoring this context that the justice gap 
could appear to be either natural or inevitable. 
 
The failure to attend to this historical context continues to ob-
scure the relationship between the decline of LSC, the growth of the 
justice gap, and the broader process of welfare retrenchment and 
                                                          
64 Documenting the Justice Gap in America: The Current Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-
Income Americans, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. 1–2 (2009), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf. 
65 See, e.g., Debra Gardner, Justice Delayed Is, Once Again, Justice Denied: The Overdue Right 
to Counsel in Civil Cases, 37 BALT. L. REV. 59, 61 n.20 (2007); Rebecca Sharpless, More Than 
One Lane Wide: Against Hierarchies of Helping in Progressive Legal Advocacy, 19 CLINICAL 
L. REV. 247, 352 n.25 (2012); Daniel Vandekoolwyk, Threshold Obstacles to Justice: The In-
teraction of Procedural and Substantive Law in the United States, France, and China, 23 PAC. 
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 187, 192 n.33 (2010). 
66 See John P. Gross, Dispelling the Myth that Law Students Can Close the Justice Gap, 58 B.C. 
L. REV. 26, 32–33 (2017) (arguing that “states need to adequately fund the indigent defense de-
livery systems”); James J. Sandman, President, Legal Services Corporation, Hawaii Access to 
Justice Conference: Rethinking Access to Justice (June 20, 2014) (transcript available at 
https://www.lsc.gov/rethinking-access-justice-james-j-sandman-hawaii-access-justice-confer-
ence) (asserting that “accepting” the lack of legal services as the result of inadequate funding is 
a form of “complacency”). 
67 See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text. 
68 See supra notes 26–49 and accompanying text. 
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neoliberalization in American domestic policy. The economic crises of 
the 1970s helped to destabilize the dominant paradigm of Keynesian 
economic policy typified by the New Deal and Lyndon Johnson’s Great 
Society.69 This legitimation crisis helped fuel the electoral successes for 
Reagan and other New Right politicians, who wove the neoliberal cri-
tique of Keynesianism into narratives of rugged individualism, personal 
responsibility, and family values.70 The goals of economic prosperity 
and moral rectitude were tightly intertwined in this narrative: both 
would require dismantling the overgrown “nanny state”71 and empow-
ering the private sector through schemes of deregulation, privatization, 
and tax cuts.72  
 
Neoliberalism’s ascendance unleashed what David Harvey de-
scribed as a sustained “assault upon institutions, such as trade unions 
and welfare rights organizations, that sought to protect and further 
working-class interests,” accompanied by “savage cutbacks in social ex-
penditures and the welfare state, and the passing of all responsibility for 
their well-being to individuals and their families.”73 The fact that these 
efforts were ever only partly successful has nonetheless left a much tat-
tered social safety net to cope with the problems brought on by rising 
wealth inequality. Unfortunately, in the case of legal aid, even its sup-
porters have tended focus rather myopically on the “justice gap” as an 
isolated phenomenon, rather than as a symptom of the broader problem 
of widening inequality associated with widespread adoption of neolib-
eral social policies.74 This narrow focus has, in turn, severely con-
strained the ability to engage in a critique of the chronic state of 
                                                          
69 JAMIE PECK, CONSTRUCTIONS OF NEOLIBERAL REASON 122 (2014). 
70 DANIEL STEDMAN JONES, MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE: HAYEK, FRIEDMAN, AND THE BIRTH OF 
NEOLIBERAL POLITICS 11–12, 86 (2012).   
71 A “nanny state” is described as a “paternalistic government” in which the “nanny who, by 
intervening in her protégés’ autonomy ostensibly for their own good, infantilizes them and ren-
ders them incapable of exercising that autonomy.” JULIAN LE GRAND & BILL NEW, 
GOVERNMENT PATERNALISM: NANNY STATE OR HELPFUL FRIEND? 109 (2015).   
72 See id. at 263–64 (discussing Reagan’s economic policy which focused on four things: “in-
creased deregulation and market liberalization, tighter control of the money supply, tax cuts, 
and cuts in public spending”). See generally Edward L. Rubin, Deregulation, Reregulation and 
the Myth of the Market, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1249, 1258 (1998) (“In its classic form, eco-
nomic analysis demonstrates that a free market will maximize wealth, while a regulated market, 
one in which the government intervenes for reasons other than the correction of market failure, 
will not.”). 
73 David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 610 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 22, 32 (2007). 
74 See generally What We Do, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., https://www.lsc.gov/about-lsc/what-we-do 
(last visited Dec. 24, 2018) (stating that the Legal Services Corporation’s mission is focused on 
“providing legal assistance to those who face an economic barrier to adequate counsel will serve 
best the ends of justice and assist in improving opportunities for low-income persons”). 
KUNKEL  
376 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 18:2 
underfunding for legal services or to imagine responses to the problem 
from outside the framework of neoliberal assumptions.    
III. TECHNOCRACY 
Over the past four decades, neoliberalism has gone from an ex-
plicit challenge to Keynesianism to constituting a large part of the status 
quo in not only economics but in political thought as well.75 As this 
process unfolded, the normative discourse explicitly directed at justify-
ing neoliberal policy prescriptions has given way to what political phi-
losophers have termed a “political rationality”: a mode of reasoning, 
with a set of more or less implicit metaphysical and ethical assumptions, 
which sets the terms for discussing the legitimate exercise of power.76 
In Wendy Brown’s77 account of neoliberal political rationality, a central 
feature that marks neoliberalism as distinct from other normative dis-
courses is the emergence of market-based norms as the dominant ones 
across all spheres, including what, under classical liberal thought, was 
typically regarded as a separate realm of political life.78    
 
This proliferation of market norms has far reaching conse-
quences, but of particular relevance to the topic at hand is the emergence 
of the concept of “governance,” which replaces the political act of gov-
erning with dissemination of managerial norms and application of ex-
pertise.79 Brown argues that as a consequence of neoliberalism’s substi-
tution of the managerialist concept of governance:  
 
[P]ublic life is reduced to problem solving and program 
implementation, a casting that brackets or eliminates pol-
itics, conflict, and deliberation about common values or 
ends . . . . As problem solving replaces deliberation about 
social conditions and possible political futures, as con-
sensus replaces contestation among diverse perspectives, 
political life is emptied of what theorists such as 
                                                          
75 JONES, supra note 70, at 263. 
76 WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION 120–21 
(2015). 
77 Wendy Brown is Class of 1936 First Chair of Political Science at the University of California, 
Berkeley. Professor Brown’s fields of interest include the history of political theory, nineteenth 
and twentieth century Continental theory, critical theory, and theories of contemporary capital-
ism. Wendy Brown, BERKELEY POL. SCI., http://polisci.berkeley.edu/people/person/wendy-
brown (last visited Dec. 16, 2018). 
78 BROWN, supra note 76, at 108–09.   
79 Id. at 126–27. 
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Machiavelli took to be its heart and the index of its 
health: robust expressions of different political positions 
and desires.80 
 
These observations provide a useful starting point for under-
standing the proliferation of technocratic responses to the justice gap. 
LSC’s own recent direction has reinforced the ahistorical impression 
that the justice gap is an intractable problem built into the nature of the 
project of providing full service legal assistance to the poor.81 The prem-
ise of a 2012 LSC-sponsored Summit on the Use of Technology to Ex-
pand Access to Justice was the need to transform LSC’s mode of “ser-
vice delivery” through the use of technology in light of the conclusions 
it reached in Documenting the Justice Gap in America.82 Others have 
taken up the suggestion that there is something flawed in the basic idea 
of legal services programs. For example, one 2015 article remarked: 
 
After a generation of efforts to increase the funding for 
legal services, to expand the types of cases in which in-
digent civil litigants are entitled to counsel at public ex-
pense, and to expand the amount of pro bono services 
donated by the private bar, it is unrealistic—given cur-
rent resource limitations and demand for legal help—to 
expect that we can provide a lawyer for every poor per-
son with an essential civil legal need, let alone every per-
son of modest means with such a problem. 83   
                                                          
80 Id. at 127. 
81 See The Justice Gap, supra note 2, at 9 (“This ‘justice gap’ – the difference between civil 
legal needs of low-income Americans and the resources available to meet those needs – has 
stretched into a gulf.”). 
82 Report of The Summit on the Use of Technology to Expand Access to Justice, LEGAL SERVS. 
CORP. 1–2 (2013), https://www.lsc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/LSC_Tech%20Summit%20Report_2013.pdf [hereinafter Summit Report] (“Technol-
ogy can and must play a vital role in transforming service delivery so that all poor people in the 
United States with an essential civil legal need obtain some form of effective assistance.”). 
83 John M. Greacen et al., From Market Failure to 100% Access: Toward a Civil Justice Con-
tinuum, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 551, 552–53 (2015). See James J. Sandman, The Cur-
rent State of Access to Justice in the United States, 22 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 453, 458 
(2015) (“We are in many ways still dealing with a service delivery model that was originally 
created with the noble goal of providing a lawyer for every individual person . . . . We need to 
identify other types of service that might provide meaningful assistance to unrepresented peo-
ple.”); James J. Sandman, President, Legal Services Corporation, Hawaii Access to Justice Con-
ference: Rethinking Access to Justice (June 20, 2014) (transcript available at 
https://www.lsc.gov/rethinking-access-justice-james-j-sandman-hawaii-access-justice-
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Such accounts of the failure of legal aid ignore its highly 
politicized history, and instead attribute its failure to provide universal 
access to justice to poor “design.”84 This causal narrative helps to frame 
the pursuit of access to justice as an essentially apolitical project of 
fixing a flawed but ideologically neutral design. Particular suggestions 
for the nature of the improved design vary: they range from the creation 
of new, more efficient, forms for the organization of law offices;85 to 
the development and improvement of self-help tools;86 to the 
deregulation of legal practice.87 In a 2011 article, court consultant 
                                                          
conference) (“In light of the realities we face, we need to rethink the goal of the access to justice 
movement. Is it to provide full representation for every client in every case? That is not realistic 
. . . . The fact is that some assistance is better than no assistance.”). 
84 See CHARLES L. OWEN ET AL., ACCESS TO JUSTICE: MEETING THE NEEDS OF SELF REPRESENTED 
LITIGANTS 3 (2002) (arguing that the “American ideal for justice” is attainable by “systemati-
cally removing the unnecessary, simplifying the necessary, and rethinking processes from the 
standpoints of those who must use them”). 
85 See generally Raymond H. Brescia et al., Embracing Disruption: How Technological 
Changes in the Delivery of Legal Services Can Improve Access to Justice, 78 ALB. L. REV. 553, 
554 (2015) (discussing how “true disruption” in the legal field is “likely to come from those 
serving the ‘lower end’ of the market,” including “solo practitioners, legal services lawyers, and 
‘low bono’ providers of legal services”); Benjamin P. Cooper, Access to Justice Without Law-
yers, 47 AKRON L. REV. 205, 208 (2014) (describing the rise of standardized pro se forms in 
various jurisdictions); Michael J. Wolf, Collaborative Technology Improves Access to Justice, 
15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 759, 771–72 (2012) (outlining nascent collaborative legal 
technologies and tools which low-income individuals “understand and [can] use to efficiently 
engage with the legal forum”). 
86 See Rochelle Klempner, The Case for Court-Based Document Assembly Programs: A Review 
of the New York State Court System’s “DIY” Forms, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J.  1189, 1189 (2014) 
(exploring New York’s pro se form programs and court-based document assembly programs); 
Ronald W. Staudt, All the Wild Possibilities: Technology That Attacks Barriers to Access to 
Justice, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1117, 1117 (2009) (discussing the new software tool “A2J Author” 
which serves as an “interface for public access to legal processes” and provides “the connection 
to the customer”); Richard Zorza, Self-Represented Litigants and the Access to Justice Revolu-
tion in the State Courts: Cross-Pollinating Perspectives Toward a Dialogue for Innovation in 
the Courts and the Administrative Law System, 29 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 63, 68–
78 (2009) (describing “accessing the system innovations” which “provide…a comprehensive 
picture of the claim” and “give the litigant himself a fuller understanding of the claim” thus 
making the hearing “more efficient and more comprehensive”). See generally Cooper, supra 
note 85; Wolf, supra note 85.  
87 See generally Deborah J. Cantrell, The Obligation of Legal Aid Lawyers to Champion Prac-
tice by Nonlawyers, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (2004) (reviewing the case for eliminating unau-
thorized practice of law restrictions); Cooper, supra note 63 (examining ways in which “con-
sumers are gaining greater access to the justice system without using lawyers”); Gillian K. 
Hadfield & Deborah L. Rhode, How to Regulate Legal Service to Promote Access, Innovation, 
and the Quality of Lawyering, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1191 (2016) (arguing that “good regulatory 
solutions are available to ensure that more open and flexile professional models – ones that 
allow the practice of law by alternative provides and business structures – deliver high quality, 
lower cost, greater innovation, and more access to those currently excluded from our justice 
systems”); Marcus J. Lock, Increasing Access to Justice: Expanding the Role of Nonlawyers in 
the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Coloradans, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 459 (2001) 
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Richard Zorza dubbed a confluence of such approaches—which he 
summarized as “court simplification and services, bar flexibility, legal 
aid efficiency and availability, and systems of triage and assignment”—
part of an “emerging consensus” on how best to deal with the justice 
gap.88 The common denominator which links these suggestions together 
is the underlying promise that individual action, entrepreneurialism, and 
innovation will generate a universally palatable solutions without the 
need to engage conflicting viewpoints or make difficult decisions be-
tween competing values.   
 
These uncritical concessions neoliberal rationality—and espe-
cially to the primacy of individualistic norms emphasizing voluntary, 
technical solutions to social problems—undermine the very vocabulary 
that would allow us to conceive of problems faced by the poor in the 
legal system as raising essential questions of justice. While alternative 
versions of access to justice concept have not disappeared from the in-
tellectual landscape completely, the connection between legal aid and 
more fundamentally egalitarian concerns about the distribution of 
wealth and power in society is hard to make out in the midst of a com-
mon presupposition that “access to justice” poses no more than a design 
problem, with claims of justice amounting to no more than a mandate 
for efficient resolution of this problem. This is a result with a distinct 
ideological dimension, as it tends to obscure the role of political and 
material inequalities in producing disparate outcomes in both the justice 
system and the larger society—the very problem that many had once 
hoped legal aid and access to justice measures could help to overcome.   
 
The technocratic impulse has, in recent years, been taken to its 
logical conclusion in an access to justice project implemented in the 
New York State courts.89 Following draconian budget cuts in the 2011-
2012 fiscal year, the New York court system implemented a celebrated 
self-help forms program designed to “address barriers to access to jus-
tice that litigants face when they create their court papers.”90 The forms 
                                                          
(exploring the de-regulation of the Colorado legal market via a limited representation rule that 
allows an attorney to provide discrete legal services to an otherwise pro se party and to charge 
the client accordingly); Richard Zorza & David Udell, New Role for Non-Lawyers to Increase 
Access to Justice, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1259 (2014) (surveying the current access to justice 
reform initiatives and their results and noting that the “pressure for deregulation comes from the 
perception that lawyer self-regulation is the cause of barriers to access”). 
88 Richard Zorza, Access to Justice: The Emerging Consensus and Some Questions and Impli-
cations, 94 JUDICATURE 156, 156–57 (2011). 
89 See Klempner, supra note 86, at 1204–14. 
90 Id. at 1193. 
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program began as a way to help ease interactions for people who typi-
cally came to court without lawyers because they were unable to afford 
them: tenants in landlord and tenant court.91 As tenant’s forms program 
began to meet with some success, the court then started making pro se 
forms for landlords as well.92  This concession, while framed in terms 
of providing access to justice, ignores the idea that some people already 
have access to a bit more justice than others, and that the demands of 
justice may therefore require a positive intervention on behalf of the 
poor in order to level the playing field.  
 
The New York courts’ concern with formal neutrality is symp-
tomatic of a retreat from access to justice based on a model of full-ser-
vice advocacy that could be a tool in the service of leveling class-based 
power differentials in the justice system, to an increasingly common 
view that access to justice is a mechanism for improving courtroom ef-
ficiency and spurring investment in technology. On a more fundamental 
level, this development marks a turn away from more substantive egal-
itarian concerns, towards a thin conception of equality as consisting of 
nothing more than the chance to buy a ticket in a social and economic 
lottery, in which the odds of winning are vanishingly small. This turn 
away from substantive equality between outcomes is similarly reflected 
by a shift in the rhetoric employed by LSC and its leaders.93 As LSC has 
become resigned to its inability to affect not only sweeping changes in 
the law but also to scrape together sufficient funding to ensure a mod-
erate level of representation of poor people in most of their day to day 
legal problems, the agency has recast its aspirations to providing “some 
form of effective assistance to 100% (emphasis added)” of its potential 
clientele.94 One finds in subsequent iterations this already milquetoast 
rendition of the agency’s mission diluted to the even more anemic slo-





While not all of the technocratic solutions proposed in the access 
to justice literature are expressly technological, the promise of technol-
ogy as a way to fill the justice gap has emerged as a central preoccupa-
tion. A major source of this interest is no doubt LSC’s Technology 
                                                          
91 Id. at 1205–06. 
92 Id. at 1208. 
93 Summit Report, supra note 82, at 1. 
94 Id. 
95 See generally Greacen, et al., supra note 83. 
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Initiative Grant (TIG) program, which incentivizes legal services pro-
viders to generate technological interventions to cope with what had be-
come, by the time of the grant program’s creation, chronically inade-
quate levels of funding.96 The grant program was the suggestion of the 
first summit LSC convened on the use of technology to improve access 
to justice in 199897–a scant two years after the largest one-year drop in 
funding in the Corporation’s history.98 Congress began approving fund-
ing for the program in 2000 and the grants have continued to be awarded 
throughout the subsequent years.99 Over this period, LSC disbursed TIG 
grants for two major categories of projects: upgrades to internal IT in-
frastructure for legal services agencies and development of end user ap-
plications.100 Examples of the latter include legal aid websites, self-help 
legal forms, instructional videos, and online intake and “triage” web in-
terfaces.101  
 
TIG program’s technological imperative has been further pro-
moted through an annual Technology Initiative Grants Conference,102 
as well as a 2012 “Summit on the Use of Technology to Expand Access 
to Justice,” which resulted in the publication of an official report by LSC 
and a special issue of the Harvard Journal of Law and Technology re-
porting the proceedings of the first half of the summit.103 The mission 
of the summit, as stated by the planning committee, was “to explore the 
potential of technology to move the United States toward providing 
some form of effective assistance to 100% of persons otherwise unable 
to afford an attorney for dealing with essential civil legal needs.”104 The 
resulting report, articulates a “vision of an integrated service-delivery 
system” consisting of 5 components:  
 
                                                          
96 Technology Initiative Grant Program, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., https://www.lsc.gov/grants-
grantee-resources/our-grant-programs/tig#Overview (last visited Dec. 17, 2018). 
97 John Graecan, Introduction: Using Technology to Enhance Access to Justice, 26 HARV. J. L. 
& TECH. 243, 244 (2013).  
98 2013 LSC By the Numbers, supra note 41. Between 1995 and 1996, LSC experienced a -
30.5% percentage change in funding. Id. 
99 Technology Initiative Grant Program, supra note 96. 
100 See 2012 TIG Project Descriptions, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., https://www.lsc.gov/2012-tig-pro-
ject-descriptions (last visited Dec. 20, 2018). 
101 Id. 
102 See Past TIG Conferences Materials, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., https://www.lsc.gov/meetings-
events/tig-conference/past-tig-conferences-materials (last visited Dec. 20, 2018). TIG has 
hosted its annual legal aid technology conference since 2000 and is the only national event fo-
cused exclusively on the use of technology in the legal aid community. Id. 
103 James E. Cabral et al., Using Technology to Enhance Access to Justice, 26 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 243 (2012); Summit Report, supra note 82. 
104 Summit Report, supra note 82, at 1. 
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1. Creating in each state a unified “legal portal” which, 
by an automated triage process, directs persons needing 
legal assistance to the most appropriate form of assis-
tance and guides self-represented litigants through the 
entire legal process 2. Deploying sophisticated document 
assembly applications to support the creation of legal 
documents by service providers and by litigants them-
selves and linking the document creation process to the 
delivery of legal information and limited scope legal rep-
resentation 3. Taking advantage of mobile technologies 
to reach more persons more effectively 4. Applying busi-
ness process/analysis to all access-to-justice activities to 
make them as efficient as practicable 5. Developing “ex-
pert systems” to assist lawyers and other services provid-
ers.105 
 
A. Technology and Exclusion 
While the Summit report106 and associated white papers107 are 
long on visionary rhetoric, they are short on the sorts of empirical data 
that might serve to justify the major premise of the TIG program: that 
technology would effectively function as a lower cost replacement of 
legal aid and thus succeed where society had failed at providing mean-
ingful access to justice to the poor.  
 
The need for such justification appears particularly pressing 
given the prominent role of end user applications in the summit’s “vi-
sion.” The bearing of income and wealth on relative levels of computer 
use and proficiency are well known.108  Moreover, as the “vision” was 
outlined in the summit report, technology would play a key gatekeeping 
role in determining the extent of the services available to prospective 
                                                          
105 Id. at 2. 
106 Id. 
107 James E. Cabral et al., supra note 103. 
108 See JAN A.G.M. VAN DIJK, THE DEEPENING DIVIDE: INEQUALITY IN THE INFORMATION 
SOCIETY (2005) (noting the societal and political implications on the deepening digital divide); 
LISA J. SERVON, BRIDGING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: TECHNOLOGY, COMMUNITY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
(2002) (assessing the policies in the United States designed to address the social problems cre-
ated by low-income individuals’ lack of access to technology). 
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clients in the initial “triage” step.109  In other words, technology would 
be used to determine which clients would be provided with full service 
by an attorney and which would be relegated to some form of self-help, 
technologically assisted or otherwise.  
 
A typical response to potential objections along these lines re-
buffs such concerns with evidence that the “digital divide” is closing.  
For example, Bonnie Rose Hough’s contribution to the summit papers 
acknowledges the objections surrounding potential disadvantage to res-
idents of rural areas that lack IT infrastructure, people with disabilities, 
and people with limited English proficiency.110 However, the paper re-
mains silent on the larger issue of whether the self-help with the assis-
tance of technology really represents a reasonable alternative to full-
service legal representation.111 It concludes on an upbeat note, observ-
ing that: 
 
When LSC and state courts began their statewide self-
help websites, of the half of American adults without In-
ternet access, 57% did not wish to gain access. Yet the 
digital divide was never a sufficient reason not to make 
maximal use of the Internet for persons who did have ac-
cess to it. The percentage of Americans who use the In-
ternet has continued to rise, reaching nearly 80% in 
2011. Today, virtually everyone has some means of ob-
taining online access — whether through her own com-
puter, through that of a relative or neighbor, or through a 
public access computer at a court or public library.112  
 
This emphasis on the digital divide presents a misleading dichot-
omy between technological “haves” and “have nots”, with the dividing 
line between the two groups being determined by physical access to the 
internet.113 This rhetorical framework tends to deflect questions that 
would implicate a more nuanced analysis of the role that existing social 
structures and inequalities play in peoples’ interactions with 
                                                          
109 Summit Report, supra note 82, at 2. The term “triage” is used to characterize a “range of 
strategies for allocating scarce resources most effectively.” Id. at 13 n.4.   
110 Bonnie Rose Hough, Let’s Not Make It Worse: Issues to Consider in Adopting New Tech-
nology, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 256, 261–63 (2012). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 266. 
113 Mark Warschauer, Reconceptualizing the Digital Divide, FIRST MONDAY (July 1, 2002), 
https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/967/888.    
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technology.114 While virtually everyone may have some sort of physical 
access to a computer, the quality of this access varies greatly with ad-
vantages and disadvantages conferred according to one’s level of 
wealth.115 Even if one accepts that the nature of the problem is ade-
quately captured in terms of an access/non-access binary, the evidence 
technology boosters typically rely upon to establish that the digital di-
vide is “closing”116 itself suggests that class continues to play a central 
role in determining what side of the divide people find themselves on. 
The same Pew research study that indicated that nearly 80% of Ameri-
cans were using the internet in 2011 also indicated that only about 62% 
of individuals with an annual household income of less than $30,000 a 
year were using the internet, with higher rates of internet usage the far-
ther up the income scale one went.117  
 
B. Technology and Customer Service Ideology 
When one considers that access to justice movement has histor-
ically been concerned with the quality of justice available to the poor, 
the apparent indifference to the impact of poverty on the fairness and 
efficacy of its technological vision seems puzzling. However, this in-
difference becomes easier to comprehend when one replaces the idea 
of a client as a citizen seeking justice with the client as a customer or 
consumer in the justice system.118 The idea of the “justice customer” 
or consumer is a recurring theme in this literature, along with is the 
concern with customer or consumer-oriented design of systems for ad-
ministering legal justice.119 If potential clients are conceived as con-
sumers—rationally self-interested actors seeking to maximize 
                                                          
114 Siobhan Stevenson, Digital Divide: A Discursive Move Away from the Real Inequities, 25 
INFO. SOC’Y 1, 1–2 (2009). 
115 Id. 
116 Kathryn Zickuhr & Aaron Smith, Digital Differences, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 13, 2012), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/04/13/digital-differences/ (noting that “some” gaps in inter-
net adoption have narrowed in the past, specifically the “gap closest to disappearing is that be-
tween whites and minorities” and differences in access have become “significantly less promi-
nent over the years”). 
117 Id. 
118 See, e.g., Ronald W. Staudt, Technology for Justice Customers: Bridging the Digital Divide 
Facing Self-Represented Litigants, 5 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 71 (2005). 
119 See, e.g., id.; Robert B. Yegge, Access to Justice, 40 JUDGE’S J. 4 (2001); OWEN ET AL., supra 
note 84; Katherine Alteneder & Linda Rexer, Consumer Centric Design: The Key to 100% Ac-
cess, 16 J.L. SOC’Y 5 (2014). 
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utility120—in some sort of market for justice, the unconcern with actual 
material inequalities as an impediment to effective use of the services 
begins to reflect a perverse sort of logic. What the absorbing faith in 
self-help technologies presume, and the phrase justice customer belies, 
is an essentially economic conception of the person as, above all else, 
an actor whose agency is expressed through actions and decisions that 
take place within markets.121 This conception presupposes a radically 
individualist idea of agency and utter disregard for inequalities—be 
they material, social, or physical—as factors which may limiting or 
preventing some people from doing things that seem quite trivial to 
others.  In this sense, moral standing is measured in market terms—
only insofar as individuals are able to engage in adequate levels of 
“self-care” according to their choices in a given marketplace are they 
worthy of moral consideration.122 The conclusion that follows from 
this conception is that if a justice customer fails to take adequate care 
by availing themselves of the new technological products in the justice 
marketplace, they ultimately have only themselves to blame. 
 
The foregoing explanation leaves some uncertainty surround-
ing the question of why designers should continue to bother with the 
needs of low-income consumers who are, after all, only able to partici-
pate in the “market” for justice in an at best dysfunctional manner re-
quiring state intervention. Even the presupposition that access to jus-
tice remains primarily concerned with the needs of the “justice 
consumer” may still a bit off the mark. As Hilary Sommerlad phrased 
it in a critique of neoliberal reforms of the United Kingdom’s legal aid 
system, “the legal aid client is the product and her production is facili-
tated by her reconstruction as a self-entrepreneurial actor who should 
be able to access justice with a minimal level of professional assis-
tance.”123 
 
The forgoing perspective helps to explain why so many con-
temporary discussions of access to justice slide seamlessly between the 
language of justice and the language of efficiency as rationales for 
                                                          
120 Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1762 (2003) 
(recognizing that consumers are often defined as seeking to maximize utility). 
121 Wendy Brown, American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democrati-
zation, 34 POL. THEORY 690, 694 (2006). 
122 Id. 
123 Hilary Sommerlad, Reflections on the Reconfiguration of Access to Justice, 15 INT’L J. LEGAL 
PROF. 179, 188 (2008). 
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their proposals.124 While overall system-wide efficiency matters little 
from the perspective of a client, there are two ways in which efficiency 
is a key interest of other actors in the legal system.  For those who 
work in the courts, efficiency translates into the ability to process 
dockets with minimal friction, an interest which is jeopardized by a 
glut of pro se litigants.125 Pro se litigants—unlike professional attor-
neys—cannot be depended upon to internalize the rules of the system 
or the language used to communicate their positions to the court, with 
the result that judges and other court staff are likely to require much 
additional time reviewing their filings and interacting with them dur-
ing court appearances.126 What is typically presented as providing ac-
cess to justice for unrepresented individuals is actually more con-
cerned with bringing standardization and order to their interactions 
with the court—for example, through the use of electronically assem-
bled forms—that will facilitate smooth processing of their claims.127 
Once the original claim to justice is conflated with this efficiency aim, 
the concern that some may be disadvantaged by the displacement of 
professional service with self-help facilitated by technology is of less 
concern than whether the system has introduced enough regularity to 
the proceedings to be worth the cost of its development. 
C. Access to Justice and Techno-Entrepreneurship 
A second common meaning that efficiency takes on in the dis-
cussion of access to justice concerns the efficient allocation of the re-
sources available to provide legal services.128 In this sense, what is ef-
ficient is that which optimizes the amount of justice dispensed, given 
the amount of resources available. Leaving aside for a moment the dis-
sonance introduced by the idea of plugging an immeasurable like jus-
tice into the cost-benefit calculus, this conception raises a larger ques-
tion about what seems to be a rather bold assumption that technology 
will necessarily deliver on this promise of efficiency. In candid 
                                                          
124 See, e.g., Rebecca A. Albrecht et al., Judicial Techniques for Cases Involving Self-Repre-
sented Litigants, JUDGE’S J. 16 (2003); Bonnie Rose Hough & Richard Zorza, Tech-Supported 
Triage: The Key to Maximizing Effectiveness and Access, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 292 (2012); 
Chase T. Rogers, Access to Justice: New Approaches to Ensure Meaningful Participation, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1447 (2015); Wolf, supra note 85; Summit Report, supra note 82. 
125 See Rebecca A. Albrecht et al., supra note 124, at 16 (discussing the “dilemma” judges face 
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moments, even the most enthusiastic proponents of technological solu-
tions have admitted that there can be significant expense involved with 
developing these solutions.129 If a central problem of legal services is 
its inadequate levels of funding, why is expenditure on technology as-
sumed to be necessarily a more efficient way of allocating scarce re-
sources than direct expenditure on legal services?   
 
Justification for this tendency to equate a technological solu-
tion with increased efficiency has been deemed largely unnecessary, 
which suggests something significant about the normative assumptions 
embedded in the TIG program and the literature celebrating it.130 
Many popular depictions of high technology present it as forward-
thinking, futuristic, morally and ideologically neutral, rendering many 
possible claims about its future potential intuitively plausible.131 This 
techno-optimistic impulse, combined with the neoliberal fetish for en-
trepreneurialism, generates ready acceptance of the idea of legal ser-
vices providers should be encouraged as producers but especially as 
consumers of technology.  Congress began appropriating funds specif-
ically for TIGs even at a time when overall agency funds were at an 
all-time low in inflation-adjusted dollars.132 However, by limiting the 
recipients discretion over the funds to the implementation of techno-
logical projects, it allowed TIGs to be recast from a pure social welfare 
expenditure—disfavored in neoliberal discourse for its tendency to in-
duce an unhealthy dependency on the state for services that ought to be 
provided by individuals for themselves—to a means of seeding eco-
nomic growth by creating a new market for technological develop-
ments, ultimate control over which remain in private hands.133   
 
Ultimately, while legal representation remains difficult to com-
modify, the incorporation of technology into the provision of legal ser-
vices allows the funding nominally allocated to that purpose to “trickle 
up” to the private firms who develop, market, and maintain these 
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tools.134 This is true not only in the case of the direct expenditure of 
the grant to create the new program, which, in the grand scheme of the 
federal budget, constitutes a fairly negligible amount.135 The develop-
ment of new technological “initiatives” can lock grant recipients into 
continued dependence on commercial vendors for service and updates, 
requiring the agency to continue spending scarce discretionary funds 
on continued maintenance over a number of years even after the initial 
funds have been spent. Through these mechanisms, private firms are 
afforded an ongoing and not altogether transparent voice over the 
agency’s continuing priorities.136   
 CONCLUSION 
The access to justice movement in the United States took root in 
the mid-20th century welfare state and revolved around the creation of 
a federally funded legal aid program.137 However, the history of publicly 
funded legal aid was punctuated by acrimonious political battles almost 
from the start. Eventually, Reagan’s presidential administration coupled 
a revanchist posture toward the Legal Services Corporation with a more 
general anti-welfare philosophy to induce a long period of decline in 
funding for legal aid from which it has never recovered.138 This decline, 
coupled with the broader pattern of rising wealth inequality, have con-
tributed to the widening “justice gap” in America.   
 
While contemporary access to justice initiatives are nominally 
concerned with alleviating the justice gap, these measures now tend to 
proceed from a narrow neoliberal frame wherein both poverty and inad-
equate financial support for public institutions and programs are taken 
as a given. In years past, the goal of legal aid, especially when formu-
lated as the concern with equal access to justice—carried with it a re-
minder of one of the tensions that lies at the heart of the American 
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justice system: in a legal system predicated on adversarial process, 
where freedom from state infringement on the ability to hire the best 
counsel that money can buy is a right regarded as sacrosanct, inequali-
ties in wealth are all but guaranteed to affect outcomes in the courts. By 
working to resolve this tension without addressing the underlying prob-
lem of inequality, the uncritical embrace of neoliberalism within the ac-
cess to justice movement serves to undermine other possible visions of 
legal aid (and the legal profession more broadly) as a democratizing 
force capable of challenging the extant class structure.   
 
As federal funding for legal services—along with the other tat-
tered remnants of the American welfare state—have once again come 
into the cross-hairs of a presidential budget proposal, it is likely that 
legal aid lawyers along with other public service providers will continue 
to face intensifying downward pressure to “do more with less” in the 
coming years.  While the forceful rejection the ideological framework 
in which such austerity measures take place is not a sufficient condition 
for successfully resisting those measures, it is undoubtedly a necessary 
one.  
  
 
